000			01981nam a2200193Ia 4500
001			2007-056
003			PILC
008			160423s2007 xx 000 0 und d
020			_a9784258520411
090			_a03.03.03 IDE OP No.41 2007
100			_aHazama, Yasushi.
245			_aElectoral volatility in Turkey: _bcleaveges vs. the economy/
260			_aJapan : _bInstitute of Developing Economies/JETRO, _c2007
300			_a166pp.
504			_a Among the developing countries, Turkey stands out for its half-century history of multiparty democracy despite two brief military interventions. Its party system, however, has displayed growing electoral volatility, especially since the 1980s. This study seeks to answer the following puzzle: why is electoral volatility persistently high and even increasing, after five decades of multiparty politics? Two types of volatilities�cleavage-type volatilities based on social cleavages and retrospective-type volatilities based on voter punishment of the incumbent�are analyzed using separate regression models. The results demonstrate, first, that deep social cleavages once increased electoral volatility but that since the 1990s, they have begun to stabilize voting behavior. Second, electoral volatility as a whole nonetheless remains high because of a growing trend toward retrospective voting. Low economic growth and high unemployment are the major reasons for this. The apparent instability in the party system stems not from a lack of representation in parliament of major social groups but rather from poor government performance. Persistently high electoral volatility thus does not necessarily indicate an absence of party system institutionalization. This current phenomenon in Turkey appears to be analogous with the world trend toward declining trust in government and growing trust in democratic and party systems.
650			_aAutonomous voting - Turkey
650			_aElectoral change - Turkey
942			_cBK _2lcc
999			_c3768 _d3768