000 | 01274naa a2200217Ia 4500 | ||
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008 | 160503s9999 xx 000 0 und d | ||
001 | art0987 | ||
100 | _aQuimbo, Stella Luz A. | ||
245 | _aPricing, technology choice, and information in health care markets / | ||
300 | _app.161-178 | ||
490 | _aVol. 33 No. 1&2 2006 | ||
500 | _aSpecial Volume in Honor of Alejandro N. Herrin | ||
520 | _aThis paper proposes a pricing model for health care markets wherein providers and patients play a Nash bargaining game. In this game, bargaining power is interpreted as a measure of market structure. Thus, marginal cost pricing (monopoly pricing) can be shown as the outcome of the absence of bargaining power among providers (patients). The model is then extended to explain how, in health care markets with imperfect information, discrete technology choices are made by providers and how such choices may drive observed pricing behavior such as price discrimination. | ||
650 | _aHealth care markets | ||
650 | _aHealth care pricing model | ||
650 | _aHealth care providers | ||
650 | _aPricing behavior | ||
773 |
_w0115-9143 _tPhilippine Journal of Development |
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856 | _uhttp://dirp3.pids.gov.ph/ris/pjd/pidspjd06-healthcare.pdf | ||
942 |
_cART _2MT |
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999 |
_c7417 _d7417 |