000 01274naa a2200217Ia 4500
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001 art0987
100 _aQuimbo, Stella Luz A.
245 _aPricing, technology choice, and information in health care markets /
300 _app.161-178
490 _aVol. 33 No. 1&2 2006
500 _aSpecial Volume in Honor of Alejandro N. Herrin
520 _aThis paper proposes a pricing model for health care markets wherein providers and patients play a Nash bargaining game. In this game, bargaining power is interpreted as a measure of market structure. Thus, marginal cost pricing (monopoly pricing) can be shown as the outcome of the absence of bargaining power among providers (patients). The model is then extended to explain how, in health care markets with imperfect information, discrete technology choices are made by providers and how such choices may drive observed pricing behavior such as price discrimination.
650 _aHealth care markets
650 _aHealth care pricing model
650 _aHealth care providers
650 _aPricing behavior
773 _w0115-9143
_tPhilippine Journal of Development
856 _uhttp://dirp3.pids.gov.ph/ris/pjd/pidspjd06-healthcare.pdf
942 _cART
_2MT
999 _c7417
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